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This,  the sixth,  edition  of the NBER Macroeconomics  Annual contains  six 
papers,  with  a mix reflecting  the Annual's goal of both presenting  fron- 
tier work in macroeconomics  and applying  economic  analysis to current 
problems. 
Among  the frontier papers,  those  by Robert Hall and by Julio Rotem- 
berg  and  Michael  Woodford,  deal  with  the  perennial  macroeconomic 
issue  of  the  origins  and  mechanisms  of  business  cycles.  Both  reflect 
current research efforts to identify  the role of imperfect competition  and 
increasing  returns  in business  cycles.  The paper by John Campbell and 
Pierre Perron  summarizes  and  extends  work  on  unit  roots  in  macro- 
economic  time series; it brings nonspecialists  up to date on the implica- 
tions  of the possibility  that macroeconomic  variables,  such as GNP, M1 
or interest rates, do not return to a nonstochastic  trend. 
Three of the papers address  current policy issues.  Jean Tirole analyzes 
problems  of  privatization  in  Eastern Europe,  examining  the  economic 
rationale and implications  of different  structures of ownership  and con- 
trol. Kenneth  Froot and  Kenneth  Rogoff  study  the  implications  of the 
transition  to  a  monetary  union  in  Europe  on  the  behavior  of  central 
banks and markets in the transition.  Stanley Fischer examines  whether 
and how  macroeconomic  policies  affect growth. 
We believe  that,  once  again,  these  papers  offer a good  sample  of the 
current directions  of research in macroeconomics.  They show  the broad- 
ening  of  our  theories  of business  cycles,  as well  as the  broadening  of 
interest to include  the macroeconomic  implications  of alternative institu- 
tional arrangements,  and the mechanisms  behind  sustained  growth.  We 
limit ourselves  in this introduction  to brief descriptions  of the papers; an 
important  contribution  of  the  conference,  however,  lies  in  the  formal 
and informal comments  that follow  each paper. 2 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
Much  of  the  recent  discussion  of  the  sources  of business  cycles  has 
been organized  around labor supply  and demand,  their slopes  and their 
shifts.  In the  real business  cycle  approach,  for example,  the  emphasis 
has been on technological  shocks  shifting labor demand,  and on reasons 
why  labor supply  may  be quite  flat, so  that shifts  in demand  generate 
large movements  in employment  without  much  movement  in the  real 
wage.  Both the papers by Hall and by Rotemberg and Woodford explore 
the  implications  of  deviations  from  the  standard  real  business  cycle 
model.  The  paper  by  Hall  focuses  on  increasing  returns  in  both  the 
goods  and  the  labor market.  The  paper  by  Rotemberg  and  Woodford 
focuses  on imperfect  competition  in the goods  market. 
Hall first gets a semantic  issue  out of the way. Under perfect competi- 
tion,  one  can speak of labor supply  and labor demand  without  ambigu- 
ity. Under imperfect competition,  this may become trickier. For example, 
it is well  known  that a monopolist  does  not,  strictly speaking,  have  an 
output  supply  or a labor demand  function.  But it is easy  to extend  the 
simple  notions.  One  may  still  refer  to  the  locus  of  points  traced  by 
the real wage  and  employment  in response  to shifts in labor supply  as 
the  labor demand  locus.  Equivalently,  one  may  refer to labor demand 
as  the  locus  traced by  the  real wage  and  employment  in  response  to 
shifts in goods  demand.  Others have suggested  the use of "pseudo,"  or 
"surrogate" (Phelps)  to emphasize  the nature of those  loci; this is only a 
matter of semantics. 
With terminological  issues  out of the way, Hall argues that one should 
think of labor demand  and labor supply  as both being very flat, so that 
small  shifts  in either  one  lead  to large movements  in employment  and 
small movements  in wages. 
Hall  first looks  at labor demand, making  the  distinction  between  the 
labor demand  of an individual  firm and aggregate labor demand.  Individ- 
ual firms' demands  are downward  sloping,  but if the  marginal cost of 
one firm depends  negatively  on the level of activity of the other firms in 
the industry  or economy,  the industry or economy  labor demand may be 
much flatter, even  upward  sloping.  Thus,  Hall emphasizes  the potential 
importance  of external increasing  returns. 
He first estimates  industry  labor demand  curves. In contrast to most of 
the abundant empirical research on labor demand,  he adopts the philoso- 
phy that one should  be very picky in the choice of instruments,  that, for 
example,  traditionally  used  lagged  values  of the variables are unaccept- 
able when  one  knows  so  little about  the  properties  of the  disturbance 
term.  In this  instance,  he  restricts the  set  of instruments  to the  "Hall- 
Ramey"  set,  which  is  composed  of  the  price  of  oil,  a dummy  for the Editorial 3 
political  party in power,  and  changes  in military spending.  He  argues 
that all three variables are uncorrelated  with  shifts in technology.  (Were 
he to adopt  the Rotemberg-Woodford  approach that the markup varies 
with  the interest  rate, his instruments,  which  plausibly  affect real inter- 
est  rates,  would  become  unacceptable.)  Under  those  assumptions,  he 
finds that labor demands  are very flat, sometimes  even  upward sloping. 
He  then  marshals  additional  evidence  in  favor  of  increasing  returns, 
from work by him and others on productivity,  and from work by Ramey 
on the cyclical behavior  of inventories.  Overall, the evidence  in favor of 
increasing  returns  as  one  of  the  keys  to  understanding  the  aggregate 
production-sales-pricing  behavior  of  firms  is  fairly  compelling.  The 
question  of where  increasing  returns come from, in particular when  they 
are external,  is left largely unanswered.  Hall suggests  the importance of 
agglomeration  externalities,  the general  idea that when  activity is high, 
production  is more efficient.  While the evidence  on agglomeration  exter- 
nalities in space is compelling,  the evidence  for such externalities in time 
is, at this stage,  much less  so. 
In what is surely the most controversial part of the paper, Hall turns to 
labor  supply. He  argues  that it is also  flat. He starts from the very valid 
observation  that the margin faced by workers is not only between  work 
and leisure,  but between  work and looking  for another job. Thus, if the 
return  to  search  for a job does  not  decrease  with  unemployment,  the 
wage  that workers will require to work will not decrease with unemploy- 
ment  either,  and  thus  labor supply  will be flat. For the return to search 
not  to  decrease  as  unemployment  increases,  it must  be  the  case  that 
firms  create  new  vacancies  in  response  to  the  increase  in  unemploy- 
ment. This in turn may happen  if there are agglomeration  externalities, if 
the presence  of many  workers  searching  leads firms to create new  jobs, 
or in Hall's terminology  to reorganize.  To explore this idea, Hall relies on 
evidence  from  both  Blanchard  and  Diamond,  and  from  Davis  and 
Haltiwanger.  Blanchard and Diamond  show  that the probability of exit- 
ing  from  unemployment  to  employment  does  not  decrease  much  in 
recessions;  this supports  Hall's thesis.  But they also show that the proba- 
bility of exiting  from nonemployment-unemployment  plus  out of the 
labor force-to  employment  does  decrease  a lot,  and that vacancies  go 
down  very  much  in recessions.  Davis-Haltiwanger  show  that their in- 
dex of reallocation,  equal to the sum of job creation and job destruction, 
indeed  goes  up in recessions.  But this comes  from a large increase in job 
destruction  and  a  small  decrease  in job creation.  Other  pieces  of  evi- 
dence  that do not quite fit are given  by the discussants. 
As  the  discussants  point  out,  the paper by Hall is unlikely  to be the 4 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
definitive  truth  on  the  topic  of business  cycles.  But by taking  external 
increasing  returns  out  of the  theoretical  closet,  and showing  how  they 
can  explain  a  number  of  important  aspects  of  cyclical behavior,  from 
labor demand  to  inventories  to  reorganization  and  the  reallocation  of 
labor, it represents  substantial  progress  and is likely to generate  further 
empirical research. 
Under  the conventional  view  of labor demand  as derived  from profit 
maximization  by competitive  firms, and absent shifts in technology,  one 
should observe  a negative  relation between  employment  and real wages. 
The cyclical behavior  of the real wage  is one of the longest-running  sub- 
jects in macroeconomics,  and the subject of several papers in earlier issues 
of this Annual. The evidence  suggests  that the real wage  is, if anything, 
procyclical. Thus,  one must either argue in favor of technological  shocks 
that shift labor demand  or relax the assumption  of perfect competition. 
Rotemberg and Woodford argue that the solution to the problem lies with 
models  of imperfect competition.  They draw out the implications of three 
such models. 
In the first model,  firms are monopolistic  competitors  whose  elasticity 
of demand  depends  positively  on  the level  of sales.  Thus,  as sales and 
employment  increase,  marginal  cost  may  increase  but  the  markup  of 
price over  marginal  cost  will  decrease.  Thus,  the markup of price over 
the  wage  may  decrease;  put  another  way,  the  real wage,  which  is the 
inverse  of the markup,  may increase with  employment.  This theory can 
explain an upward  sloping  "labor demand"  curve. 
In the  second  model,  current  prices  affect  both  current  and  future 
sales, for example,  because  a firm tends to retain customers  so long as its 
price  is  not  raised  above  levels  at  which  customers  think  it is  worth 
searching  for  a  better  price.  In  these  models,  the  firm  sets  its  price 
comparing  current  revenues  from  a  higher  price  with  future  losses 
caused  by the  price rise.  Thus  when  current revenue  is low  relative to 
expected  future  revenue,  the  firm will  set a low  price to have  a larger 
share of a larger market in the future.  In this model,  an increase in the 
value of future profits compared  to current profits leads to a reduction in 
the  markup,  or equivalently  to  an  increase  in  the  real wage  at given 
employment;  it shifts the labor demand  curve out. 
In the  third model,  oligopolies  implicitly  collude,  with  the  collusion 
being maintained  by the threat that a firm that reduces its price will face 
a price war, implying  lower  future profits.  In this model,  an increase in 
expected  future profits compared  to current profits reduces the incentive 
to cut prices (because  the loss  of future profits in the case of a price war Editorial  5 
will be larger). Thus, it leads to an increase in the markup given employ- 
ment; it shifts the labor demand  curve in. 
Thus  the  three  models  have  different  empirical implications  with  re- 
spect  to the behavior  of the  markup  with  respect  to the ratio of devia- 
tions of output  to the expected  present  value  of output.  As the present 
discounted  value  of  future  output  is  not  observable,  Rotemberg  and 
Woodford  therefore  construct  and  work  with  several  proxies  for  that 
variable.  They  also  construct  several  estimates  of markups.  They  con- 
clude  that the bulk of their aggregate  evidence  is more consistent  with 
the implicit collusion  model  than with the other models. 
They then  examine  industry  level  relationships.  In particular, if collu- 
sion  is  an  important  part  of  the  explanation  of  markups,  then  more 
concentrated  industries-in  which  collusion  is easier-should  see more 
countercyclical  markups.  The results  here  too are, on the whole,  more 
consistent  with  the  implicit  collusion  model  than  with  the  other  two 
models.  In addition,  they  use  data from two  industries  in which  collu- 
sion  is  known  to  have  taken  place-baby  foods  and  electrical equip- 
ment-and  find that markups  tended  to be countercyclical. 
The paper therefore  concludes  that collusion  in the goods  market is a 
central component  of business  cycles.  It argues that changes  in the com- 
position  of aggregate  demand  that increase  real interest  rates therefore 
lead firms to decrease  markups at given  employment,  leading  in turn to 
an expansion  of employment.  We strongly  suspect  that the paper over- 
plays the role of collusion  in the business  cycle. But one must,  however, 
be impressed  by the weight  of empirical evidence  brought to bear on the 
issue. 
Ten years  ago,  an econometrician  estimating,  say, a money  demand 
equation  would  not have given  much thought  to the time series proper- 
ties  of  the  individual  variables  in  the  regressions  or  to  those  of  the 
residual,  except perhaps  to do a standard serial correlation correction, if 
faced with a low Durbin Watson. After 10 years of research on unit roots 
and  cointegration,  how  differently  should  she  proceed  today?  Should 
she test for unit roots in each variable, and if so using which of the many 
available tests? Should  she look for cointegration  between  the variables, 
and if so how? Should  she use instruments  to correct for potential simul- 
taneity, or just run OLS? Questions  such as these motivate the survey by 
Campbell and Perron. There is no point in summarizing  it, except to say 
that the paper, which  deals with both univariate and multivariate issues, 
is both rigorous  and designed  to be read by nonspecialists.  And,  at the 
end,  they  indeed  show  how  a  researcher  should,  in  the  light  of  the 6 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
survey,  estimate  a  money  demand  function,  and  how  to  do  Granger 
causality  tests,  and  how  to test  the expectation  hypothesis  of the term 
structure, today. Yes, the econometrician  should  check the order of inte- 
gration  of  the  variables.  Yes,  she  should  test  for cointegration  of  real 
money  balances,  output,  and  nominal  interest  rates. And,  yes,  if these 
variables are indeed  cointegrated,  she may not need  to use instruments 
to estimate  money  demand. 
The problems  of East European  transition  have  captured  the interest 
of much of the economics  profession  as well as the entire world.  Central 
among  those  problems  is that of privatization of state owned  assets,  and 
particularly  industrial  firms.  Privatization  is  proceeding  in  different 
ways  in  different  countries:  very  small  firms  have  been  successfully 
privatized  in several  countries,  but the privatization  of the four or five 
hundred  largest  industrial  firms,  which  typically  account  for well  over 
half the industrial  output  in the East European countries,  has proceeded 
very  slowly.  Voucher  schemes  are in the  process  of implementation  in 
Poland  and  Czechoslovakia,  while  in  Hungary  firms  are  being  sold 
rather than given  away. 
There is already a large and intensely  practical literature on privatiza- 
tion.  Perhaps  because  of  the  generally  recognized  urgency  for action, 
this  literature has  drawn  relatively  little on  the existing  analyses  of re- 
lated  issues  in industrial  organization  and  finance.  Jean Tirole's paper 
handsomely  repairs that omission.  In the body  of his paper he sets out 
general  principles  of  the  role  of  stock  markets,  methods  of providing 
managerial incentives,  and the significance  of market structure, without 
particular reference  to  the  problems  of Eastern Europe.  He  introduces 
the notion  of the power  of a regulatory  scheme,  which  is a measure  of 
the extent  to which  a firm captures  the returns to reductions  in its costs 
or increases  in its profits.  A high-powered  regulatory  scheme  provides 
incentives  for efficient  operation  of  firms,  but  also  implies  potentially 
large rents for firms and demands  detailed knowledge  of the regulators. 
Low-powered  schemes,  such  as cost-plus  contracts,  do  not  encourage 
efficiency, but they  do prevent  the collection  of large rents by the firm's 
owners. 
Tirole then  draws  on  the  principles  he  has  laid out in analyzing  the 
privatization  problem in Eastern Europe. There will be very large uncer- 
tainties  at the  start of the  transition  process-economic  and political- 
and these  are not circumstances  under  which  stock markets work well. 
Nor  will  it  be  possible  to  use  high-powered  regulatory  or  incentive 
schemes  during the noisy phase.  Accordingly, Tirole argues there should Editorial 7 
be little reliance on stock markets or on individual  entrepreneurship  dur- 
ing the early "noisy" phase  of transition; rather the stock market should 
be introduced  during the "mature" phase  of privatization. 
Tirole lays considerable  stress  on the need  for a competition-oriented 
restructuring of industry, arguing,  counter to the conventional  view, that 
trade liberalization will perform only a limited role in this context. Nor is 
he  optimistic  that  firms  can  be  restructured  after they  are privatized, 
pointing  to the difficulties  of regulators in the west in breaking up firms. 
Thus  he  sees  the  need  for a great  deal  of restructuring  in advance  of 
privatization. 
Tirole's analysis  leads  him to advocate  a strategy of privatization  that 
differs  in  several  respects  from  those  being  put  into  place  in  Eastern 
Europe. He would  first set up a group to examine which firms should be 
privatized  early,  and  which  will  need  extensive  restructuring  before 
privatization.  Foreign  experts  and  agencies  can play a role here.  He  is 
willing  to  contemplate  reasonable  delays  until  firms  are restructured. 
During the early phase  of privatization,  he advocates  placing ownership 
of firms in  holding  companies,  which  would  not,  however,  engage  in 
stock market  trading.  Shares  in the  holding  companies  can be distrib- 
uted,  free,  to the population,  but trading would  commence  only  when 
the  mature  phase  begins.  In the  meantime  the  holding  companies,  on 
whose  boards  foreigners,  including  representatives  of official agencies, 
could  serve,  help  prevent  the  capture  of  the  companies  by  interest 
groups. 
Beyond  the  specific  scheme  however,  it  is  clear  that  Tirole's 
paper  makes  an  important  conceptual  contribution  to  the  debate 
on privatization. 
The collapse  of the Bretton Woods exchange  rate system  in 1973 led to 
a period  of  floating  exchange  rates,  with  much  wider  swings  in rates 
than  had  generally  been  expected  before  the  changeover.  Dissatisfied 
with  exchange  rate fluctuations,  Europeans  have gradually moved  back 
to a system  of almost-fixed  rates in the European Monetary System,  and 
intend  by the end  of the century  to create a European Monetary Union 
(EMU), with irretrievably fixed rates. 
Froot and  Rogoff  focus  on  the view,  expressed  in the Delors  Report, 
that  a 4-  to  5-year  period  of  convergence  among  the  members  of  the 
EMU will  permit  a seamless  transition  into  the new  system.  They pre- 
sent  a detailed  review  of the  evidence  that has been  presented  in sup- 
port of the belief that convergence  is taking place: differences in inflation 
rates among  EMS members  have  indeed  declined;  so  have  short-term 8 - BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
interests;  and  surprisingly,  so  have  primary  (i.e.,  noninterest)  budget 
deficits.  This is impressive  evidence,  but Froot and Rogoff point out that 
even  so, Italian inflation exceeds  German inflation by as much as 4% per 
annum.  Further,  there  remain  large  gaps  between  long-term  interest 
rates, suggesting  the markets believe  exchange  rates will change at some 
point. 
Most  significantly,  Froot and  Rogoff  point  to increasing  divergence  of 
relative price levels among  countries.  That is another way of saying  that 
real exchange  rates have changed  significantly;  for example,  the lira has 
appreciated  in real terms relative to the Deutschmark.  Further, they find 
that the countries  with appreciating exchange  rates have been experienc- 
ing increasing  current account  deficits.  And  several of them,  especially 
Italy, also have growing  government  debts. 
What  accounts  for  these  real  exchange  rate,  or relative  price  level, 
movements?  Froot and Rogoff first disarm the reader by reminding  her 
that  it  has  proven  very  difficult  to  account  for  movements  in  real 
exchange rates, and then go on to show  that a relative increase in govern- 
ment  consumption  spending  tends  to produce  exchange  rate apprecia- 
tion. They also test the view that exchange rates are moved by differential 
rates of productivity  growth,  but find little evidence  to support that view. 
They conclude  that countries whose  real exchange rates have appreciated 
will probably have to cut government  consumption  spending  to undo the 
appreciations. 
Then  they  move  back  to  the  transition  to  the  EMU. The increasing 
overvaluation  of some  currencies,  and the growing  government  debts in 
those  countries,  suggests  these  countries  would  want to devalue  before 
parities are finally fixed. That would  reduce the real value of the govern- 
ment  debt.  And,  if prices  are sticky (an issue  that is raised though  not 
pursued  by  Froot and  Rogoff),  a nominal  devaluation  would  also  im- 
prove  a country's  external  competitiveness.  They  develop  a model  in 
which  central  banks  that  vanish  at  a  certain  point  (the  inception  of 
EMU)  care  progressively  less  about  their  reputations  as  the  end  ap- 
proaches,  and  are increasingly  willing  to devalue.  Since there are sev- 
eral central banks involved,  there will be a contest  to devalue  last. Thus 
they  argue  there  is  very  unlikely  to  be  a seamless  transition  into  the 
EMU. Rather,  as  the  end  approaches,  there  is  likely  to  be  increasing 
instability. 
However,  this does  not mean that a short transition would  reduce the 
instability-because  the incentives  for competitive  devaluations  just be- 
fore the creation of the EMU would  remain. Froot and Rogoff argue that 
at least one more realignment  is likely. Of course,  the future members of Editorial 9 
the  EMU can  make  that  realignment  at any  time,  by  agreement,  and 
commit  themselves  to no further realignments.  So the final realignment 
need  not come  at the last minute,  unless  the last minute is defined  to be 
the point at which  exchange  rates are fixed for the last time, rather than 
the time at which  the EMU formally goes  into effect. 
Over the past decade,  work on growth theory has grown from a trickle 
to a flood,  with  the development  of models  exploring the role in growth 
of-among  other  determinants-increasing  returns,  increased  division 
of labor, increased  diversity  of products,  R&D, human  capital, and edu- 
cation.  In doing  so,  the  focus  has  shifted  away  from issues  of fluctua- 
tions  and  short-term  macroeconomic  management.  At  the  same  time, 
the policy  advice  given  to developing  countries  by development  econo- 
mists and organizations  such as the World Bank has been increasingly  to 
get  their house  in  order,  to focus  on  the  adoption  of sound  fiscal and 
monetary  policies  as a precondition  for growth.  The goal of the paper by 
Fischer is to review  and  analyze  the evidence  on the role of macroeco- 
nomic management  in growth. 
Fischer  defines  macroeconomic  policies  as  monetary,  fiscal,  and  ex- 
change  rate policies  that  help  determine  the  rate of  inflation  and  the 
balance of payments.  There are conceptually  three ways  in which  such 
policies  may affect growth  over long  periods  of time.  First, macro poli- 
cies can lead  to long  lasting  recessions  or even  depressions,  taking out- 
put  below  its  potential  level  for  long  periods  of  time,  for  example, 
through  a sustained  overvaluation  of the currency. Second,  macro poli- 
cies  can affect relative  prices,  for example  real interest  rates,  and  thus 
affect  investment.  Third,  macro  policies  may  create  a more  favorable 
climate for growth.  The channels  here are more vague,  harder to identify 
with confidence,  but not necessarily  therefore irrelevant. Decreased  un- 
certainty may well increase investment  and boost confidence.  Lower and 
less variable inflation  may well  allow  for a better allocation of resources 
and higher output. 
Some  of  these  effects  are  conceptually  level  effects  and  others  are 
growth  effects.  Long  recessions  are usually  assumed  not  to affect  the 
long-run growth rate. Even policies that affect the investment  rate perma- 
nently  do  not,  in  standard  growth  models,  affect the  long-run  rate of 
growth,  although  they  do in a number of the more recent,  endogenous 
growth  models.  These  level/growth  distinctions,  Fischer  argues,  are 
largely irrelevant,  and anyway  impossible  to test given  the length  of the 
time series we have for most countries.  Thus, he focuses  on the effects of 
macroeconomic  policy variables on growth rates over the last 30 years in 10 *  BLANCHARD  & FISCHER 
a large cross  section  of countries,  and does  not attempt to guess  which 
ones  will eventually  disappear. 
In going to the data, Fischer introduces a useful distinction between  the 
effects of policies  that work through  physical  investment  and those  that 
work through  other channels,  such as improved  allocation, better educa- 
tion, and faster growth  of human  capital. He first reviews  the recent and 
not so recent research examining  the determinants  of growth using cross- 
country evidence.  This research has isolated a clear relation between  the 
growth  rate, the initial level of per capita output-which  comes in nega- 
tively, suggesting  that,  other things  being  equal,  poorer countries  grow 
faster and  thus  that  their income  levels  will  eventually  converge  with 
those of the richer countries,  the rate of population  growth-which  also 
comes in negatively,  a variable reflecting the level of education-probably 
coming  in as a proxy  for investment  in human  capital, and  the rate of 
physical  investment.  His first question  is whether,  given  the presence  of 
these  variables,  i.e.,  controlling  for investment  in physical  and human 
capital, macroeconomic  policies affect growth.  He finds that (1) the effect 
of inflation is significant  and negative,  (2) the effect of budget  deficits is 
significant and negative,  and (3) the effect of foreign debt is negative.  The 
results are reasonably  robust. They hold when  the time series dimension 
of the data is used  and  when  panel  data estimation  is performed.  And 
they hold under instrumental  variables estimation. 
His  second  question  is  then  whether  macroeconomic  policies  affect 
investment.  He again reviews  the empirical research on investment  equa- 
tions in developing  countries,  and adds macroeconomic  policy proxies to 
a standard  investment  equation,  one  that includes  growth  and level  of 
output  effects.  He  finds  (1) the  effect  of inflation  to be  significant  and 
negative,  (2) the effect  of budget  deficits  to be positive  (!) and insignifi- 
cant, and (3) the effect of both variables to become insignificant when  the 
black market foreign  exchange  premium  is included  in the regressions. 
Thus,  a  reasonably  clear  picture  arises  from  the  regressions,  one 
in  which  sound  macropolicy  indeed  increases  growth,  directly  and 
through  investment.  Fischer cautions  about making  too much  of those 
results.  The macro variables are only  proxies for the unobservable  poli- 
cies.  In interpreting  the regressions,  one cannot ignore the possibility  of 
reverse causality  from growth  to the proxies,  or from third factors such 
as exogenous  changes  in the terms of trade on both growth and proxies. 
In this respect,  the instruments  he uses may not be fully appropriate; it is 
hard, however,  to think of better ones.  Thus,  Fischer turns to two  case 
studies,  which  both show  the complexities  of the channels  at work. The 
first is  that  of  C6te  d'Ivoire  and  the  second  that of Chile.  In both,  he Editorial 11 
concludes,  macro  mismanagement  and  macro  policy  mistakes  in  re- 
sponse  to  shocks  bear a large  share  of  the  responsibility  for the  slow 
growth  of the last 20 years. 
The conference  at which  these  papers  were  presented  was  smoothly 
organized  and  run  by  Kirsten  Foss  Davis  and  Ilana Hardesty.  Joseph 
Beaulieu acted as editor of the papers and comments  and as rapporteur 
for the general  discussion.  He has done  a superb job. 
Olivier Jean Blanchard and Stanley Fischer 